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Abstract 
We analyze the long-run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–
2002, computing buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international 
evidence and reveal long-term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. 
Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the 
benchmarks employed. We also find that long-term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs 
conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross-sectional regressions of long-run performance 
disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform 
the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international 
evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is 
due to excessive supply of issues during the “hot IPO period”. Results associated with pricing during 
the “hot IPO period” indicate positive short- (1-year), medium- (2-year) and negative long-term (3-
year) performance. 
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1. Introduction 
A large volume of research has demonstrated that investors participating in initial public 
offerings (IPOs) of common stocks earn large positive abnormal returns in the early 
aftermarket period, as the new shares are usually sold to investors (by newly listed companies 
and the underwriters) at prices below those prevailing on the first day of trading. This is the 
“underpricing phenomenon,” which is widely accepted as internationally valid. However, if 
performance is measured over longer intervals, for example after three or five years of listing, 
IPO returns decrease and turn negative.  
     Early results by Ritter (1991) showed that US IPOs significantly underperformed in the 
three years following listing. Similar results were reported for IPOs in the United Kingdom, 
by Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al. (2000), in Australia by Lee et al. (1996), in Germany by 
Ljungqvist (1997) and in France by Chahine (2008). As a general rule, the change from 
excess positive to negative returns appears to take place within a few months after listing.  
     In a recent study by Gajewski and Gresse (2006), which involved a sample of 15 
European countries, underperformance after a short period is documented. Interestingly, the 
authors note that Greece and Portugal are exceptions, where overperformance has continued 
for several years. Thus, medium and long-term underperformance seem to be the rule, but 
with notable exceptions.  Exceptions such as the Greek case warrant deeper analysis. It may 
be that exceptional market behavior is only apparent as a result of biased measurement. If 
biased measurement proves to be the case, international evidence will be strengthened. Or, on 
the contrary, the exception may prove empirically valid. In the latter case, underlying factors 
must be sought, hopefully enriching the relevant literature. In sum, we believe that the 
“Greek exception” merits further study, and this is the task we undertake in the present paper.  
We conduct a painstaking analysis of short and long-run performance of IPOs in Greece. 
Our sample consists of 254 IPOs used to compute one-, two- and three-year abnormal returns. 
We use alternative measures of performance, a number of benchmark models and a sample of 
matching non-IPO firms for comparison with our IPO sample. We perform time-series tests 
of excess returns using three different benchmark models both in “event time” and “calendar 
time”; finally, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis of long-term excess returns using firm 
and market variables. Through such extensive empirical analysis, we gain confidence that the 
phenomena we document are robust. 
We find that the “Greek exception” is not a figment of biased measurement, but one that 
persists under a variety of measurements and methodologies. We also find that the exception 
is not permanent, but valid only for a specific time period. Hence, we turn our attention to 
possible underlying factors for the exception. We propose that besides classic short-term 
underpricing explainable by excess post-listing demand, longer-term underpricing is due to a 
very strong and competitive supply of listings that seek to exploit a window of large 
prospective profits. In Greece, this window was opened by a combined effect of market boom 
and the prospect of a unique institutional leap: Greece’s joining the Eurozone and a 
reassignment of its market from the “emerging” group to the group of developed markets.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 offers background on IPOs 
and their long-term performance. Section 2 includes a literature review on long-term 
performance of IPOs. Data and methodology are presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 
present empirical findings. Finally, Section 6 offers our conclusion.  
 
 
2. Background 
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Scholars have adequately documented the fact that IPOs are underpriced in the short run. 
Underpricing has been observed around the world in various periods (Ritter and Welch, 
(2002), Ritter (2003), Loughran et al. (1995)), even though its level has changed over time 
(Loughran and Ritter, (2002)). In the 1980s, average IPO underpricing hovered around 7%. It 
increased to 15% during the period 1990-1998 and jumped to 65% during the short 1999-
2000 period of the Internet bubble (Gajeski and Gresse, 2006). Our study of Greece covers 
the period 1994-2002.2 In our data, newly listed firms in the Athens Stock Exchange exhibit a 
first-day-adjusted return of 38.94% on average. Initial returns of 17.62% have been estimated 
for IPOs listed during the period 1994-1998, with returns of 70.35% for those listed during 
1999-2000. These findings are consistent with international evidence on short-run returns. 
Using these findings as a basis, we construct and present the long-term performance of Greek 
IPOs relative to corresponding international evidence. 
 
2.1 Theoretical aspects of the long-term performance of IPOs 
The long-run underperformance of IPOs has received considerable attention in the 
literature in recent years, leading to controversial results and findings that conflict with 
studies indicating negative, positive or even zero aftermarket performance. For instance, in 
their studies on the price performance of common stock issues in the US, Ibbotson (1975) and 
Jenkinson and Ljunqvist (2001) report no departures from market efficiency in the 
aftermarket.  Also, they did not reject the hypothesis that the abnormal returns in the long run 
are zero. They conclude that IPOs underperform by an average of approximately 1% per 
month over four years, suggesting a general positive performance reported in the first year, 
followed by a negative one in the subsequent three years and a generally positive trend in the 
fifth year.  
Derrien and Kecskes (2009) report that sentiment on its own is important to equity 
issuance and sometimes even has impressive explanatory power. In theory, if companies 
successfully time their offerings during periods when the cost of equity capital is assumed to 
be low, they would subsequently manifest low returns for investors. A possible explanation is 
the ability of firms to identify times at which the market is overvalued, or when investors will 
overpay for a specific IPO relative to other firms. With this justification, several authors have 
recently examined the behavior of the IPOs during three or even five years after their listing 
(Loughran et al. (1995)). 
     However, it would make sense to reflect on the variety of factors correlated to the long-
run performance of IPOs. Miller (1977) attributes IPO underperformance to the divergence of 
investor opinions and short-sale constraints. He implies that in early stock-offering periods, 
stock prices are generally higher with a greater differentiation of opinions for expected future 
returns. However, in the long run, prices decrease as the most optimistic investors lower their 
appraisals. Jenkinson and Ljungvist (2001) add that investors are only periodically over-
optimistic about the prospects of firms entering the market. IPOs would benefit if issuers 
could “time” their flotations to coincide with periods of exuberantly high expectations among 
investors.   
Morris (1996) argues that the heterogeneity of beliefs can support the speculative bubble 
hypothesis, as well as the overvaluation of the IPOs immediately after their issuance. 
                                                 
2 Gajeski and Gresse (2006) report that the mean raw return for the 2,104 European IPOs composing their sample is equal to 
22.06%. Loughran et al. (2008) report average initial returns of 18% for 15,490 US IPOs. Additionally, they report initial 
returns of 16.8% for 3,986 UK IPOs, 19.8% for 1,103 Australian IPOs, 15.9% for 1,008 Hong Kong IPOs, 10.7% for 686 
French IPOs, 26.9% for 652 German IPOs, 18.2% for 233 Italian IPOs, 10.1% for 181 Dutch IPOs, 20.3% for 214 New 
Zealand IPOs and only 4.2% for 40 Russian IPOs. 
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Accordingly, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Rajan and Servaes (1997) also comment on 
features related to long-run performance, emphasizing “windows of opportunity” when 
investors and security analysts tend to be systematically over-optimistic about earnings 
potential and long-term growth predictions of IPOs. They document that IPOs have better 
future performance when analysts forecast lower growth prospects.  
Others hypothesize that firms manipulate their accounting numbers and financial 
statements so as to make their offerings much more appealing to the public; therefore, 
beguiled investors pay a higher than fair price. However, this “window-dressing” technique is 
not effective in the long run since investors eventually learn the true value of the firm and 
prices fall, according to Teoh et al. (1998). 
     More recently, Ma and Shen (2003) offered an alternative explanation with regard to the 
long-run performance of IPOs. They claim that the insights of “prospect theory” can be used 
and suggest that the underperformance of IPOs is not a puzzle. Their main assumption is that 
investors have utility functions that overweight low probability events and underweight 
intermediate and high-probability outcomes as argued by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) & 
Loughran and Mola (2004). IPOs are more likely to have extremely high returns. Therefore, 
according to this theory, the low probability outcomes of achieving high returns are valued 
more than in the standard expected utility setting.  So even though average returns in the long 
run are lower, investors will still invest in IPOs because they will be compensated by the 
prospect of gaining very high positive returns.  
 
2.2 Long-term Performance of IPOs in Developed Countries 
     Ritter (1991), in his study of 1,526 US IPOs (issued between 1975-1984), found that they 
underperformed their market benchmarks by about 34.47% in a three-year period, whereas 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) reported that the NASDAQ index-adjusted return reached -
13.73% at the 250th post-listing day for a sample of 1,598 US IPOs during the period 1977-
1987. Similarly, Ritter and Welch (2002) indicated that three-year holding-period returns for 
an investor buying at the offer price would on average underperform the market significantly. 
Kooli and Suret (2001) found that investors buying IPOs immediately after listing, who held 
them for five years, would make a loss of 24.66%. Kooli and Suret attribute this to “hot 
issues”. They based their research on 445 Canadian IPOs from 1991 to 1998. 
     Moreover, Chahine (2008) also examined the post-issue performance of IPOs issued in 
France from 1996-1998. He found negative cumulative abnormal returns for the French IPOs 
of an average level of 9.94%. Lee et al. (1996) proved that the 36-month market-adjusted 
CARs for Australian IPOs were up to -51% from 1976 to 1989, whereas Allen and Patrick 
(1996) also documented significant aftermarket underperformance of -25.38%. 
     In the UK, Levis (1993) investigated the long-term performance of a sample of 483 IPOs 
issued during the period 1980-1988. He reported that British IPOs underperformed the HGSC 
Index over a three-year period by 8.31%. Similarly, Espenlaub et al. (2000) re-examined 
evidence of the long-run returns in the UK during the period 1985-1995 and found significant 
negative returns of -8.12% with the same index.  
     A study of Finnish IPOs by Keloharju (1993) documented a -26.4% long-run-cumulated 
market-adjusted return for 79 issues that went public between 1984 and 1989. He also 
confirmed the presence of winner’s curse, which was first suggested by Rock (1986). 
However, he claimed that the results reflected a temporary over-optimism of IPO investors 
that turned into disappointment when they learned more about the IPO firms’ prospects. 
Furthermore, Jakobsen and Sorensen (2001), in their study of 76 Danish IPOs from 1984 to 
1992, concluded that the market (Danish Total Stock Index) performed better than the IPO 
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stocks, and the volatility-adjusted underperformance of the IPOs, when compared to the 
market, was -30.4% after five years. In an important contrary finding, IPOs in Sweden 
indicated long-run overperformance. Brounen and Eichholz (2002) found overperformance 
equal to 18.89% for property IPOs over a period of three years. They attributed this to the 
fact that the Swedish property market has been undergoing a different phase3 than other more 
stable and mature markets.  
     Stehle et al. (2000), in their study on 187 German IPOs listed during the period 1960-
1992, concluded that average abnormal buy-and-hold returns were significant at a 5% level, 
supporting the view that IPOs listed in the main market were performing by 6% less after 
three years of listing. Bessler and Stanzel (2009) found that IPOs listed in the secondary 
German market performed worse than the market benchmark. Drobetz et al. (2005) found 
that Swiss IPOs from 1983 to 2000 had average market-adjusted initial returns of 35%, while 
Drobetz et al. (2008) did not find any significant drop in or strong continuous 
underperformance of Swiss IPO stock prices in the aftermarket, as Swiss IPOs show poor 
returns only in the very long run after 48 months of trading. These authors attribute long-run 
underperformance to the fact that IPO firms tend to be small. 
Studies have also been conducted in Mediterranean countries including Italy and Spain. 
Arosio et al.(2001) reported significant underperformance levels of -11.53% for 108 Italian 
IPOs during the period 1985-1997, whereas Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005) found that Spanish 
IPOs performed at -37.05% after five years of listing. Finally, in their pan-European study, 
Gajeski and Gresse (2006) found that the long-term abnormal returns were frequently 
negative, but that they vary over time and across countries.  In that study, they used a sample 
of 2,026 IPOs when measuring one-year performance and 1,846 IPOs when measuring three-
year performance. Evidence of underperformance at the one-year term is unclear (the average 
first-year CAR equals -21.59%, but the average first-year BHAR of -1.52% is not 
significantly different from zero), and they find a significant three-year underperformance 
with each measure: -32.61% for BHAR and -87.19% for CAR. However, Greece and 
Portugal, which exhibit overperformance, were found to be exceptions. 
In conclusion, most evidence appears to indicate negative long-run IPO performance in 
developed markets, but with notable exceptions, such as Greece. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
     This study examines long-run performance of Greek IPOs undertaken during the period 
from 1994 to 2002. The sample includes only listings of common stocks in the Athens Stock 
Exchange. This paper does not examine preference stocks or transfers from the Parallel to the 
Main markets. 
      New listings totaled 254 in the Main, Parallel and New Market segments of the Athens 
Stock Exchange. As basic sources for the construction of the IPO database, we used the 
Annual Statistical Bulletins of the Athens Stock Exchange, the Annual Reports of the 
Hellenic Capital Market Commission and specialized web sites4. We computed data on 
Book-to-Market Value (BMV) and long-term total returns, including both capital gains and 
dividend payments, from monthly return data collected from DataStream and Bloomberg. 
The returns on indices, the Athens Stock Exchange General Index (ASEGI) and the Smaller 
Companies Index are measured as total returns including dividends. Share prices and prices 
of the General A.S.E. Index are collected during the first three years of trading in the market.  
                                                 
3 The Swedish property share market went through rough times in the early nineties, leading to relatively low benchmark 
returns that were easily exceeded by the Swedish aftermarket IPO returns. 
4 For example: www.ase.gr, www.naftemporiki.gr, www.in.gr and www.stockrally.gr. 
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     The cumulative abnormal returns for a holding period of m months are measured by the 
sum of the monthly average abnormal returns from the end of the first month of trading to the 
close of mth month. Table 1 shows the IPOs launched on the Athens Stock Market during the 
period 1994-2002. The year 2000 experienced the largest number of listings in the history of 
the Athens Stock Exchange. We should point out that we classified IPOs on the basis of first 
day of trading, not on the date of the offer.  
 
Table 1 
Number of issues in A.S.E. by year and by market5: Time period: 1/1/1994 – 31/12/2002 
Year Number of 
Issues 
Main Market Parallel Market New Market Capital Raised General Index of 
ASE (31/12) 
1994 46 36 10 - 289,705,180 868.91 
1995 20 10 10 - 70,003,910 914.15 
1996 20 7 13 - 336,561,660 933.48 
1997 12 3 9 - 50,743,500 1479.63 
1998 23 10 13 - 924,329,790 2737.53 
1999 38 15 23 - 899,420,420 5535.09 
2000 53 18 35 - 2,842,882,530 3388.86 
2001 21 12 8 1 1,497,054,510 2591.56 
2002 21 8 9 4 99,712,290 1748.42 
TOTAL  254 120 128 6 7,010,413,790  
Source: Annual Reports of Hellenic Capital Market Commission, Annual & Monthly Statistical Bulletins of A.S.E 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We employ a methodology similar to Ritter (1991), we employ a structured benchmark 
portfolio6 to carefully select periods of IPO performance measurement. There is difference of 
scholarly opinion as to measurement however and we take this into account as well. Kooli 
and Suret (2001) argue that one major problem with long-run performance of IPOs is non-
standard distribution of their returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) claim that many of the 
common methods used to calculate the long-run returns are conceptually flawed and lead to 
biased test statistics. They suggest that cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are a biased 
predictor of long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and they favor the use of buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) in tests designed to detect long-run abnormal returns.  
     Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Brav (2000) report that buy-and-hold returns tend to be 
more sensitive to the problem of cross-sectional dependence among sample firms. Lyon et al. 
(1999) emphasize that the BHARs method is well-accepted among researchers interested in 
studying whether or not the offerings listed in the stock market earned abnormal returns over 
a specific period, “measuring precisely the investor experience.”  
     This study uses buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) to evaluate the long-run performance of 
Greek IPOs. We calculate three-year buy-and-hold returns, assuming that the stocks are held 
                                                 
5 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table is computed according to the first day of trading of 
a firm in the A.S.E. and not according to the interval of the public offerings. 
6 The returns in Greece are calculated for the initial return period (day 1), defined as the offering date, to the first closing 
price listed on the ASE and the aftermarket period, defined as the three years after the IPO, exclusive of the initial returns 
period. The initial return period is defined to be month 0, and the aftermarket period includes the following 36 months, and 
months are defined as successive 21-trading-day periods relative to the IPO date. Thus, month 1 consists of event days 2-22, 
month 2 consists of event days 23-43, month 3 consists of event days 44-64, etc.  
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from their offering period, mainly from first trading day and first trading month after their 
listing to the three-year anniversary of listing.  
     We calculate long-run stock exchange returns of IPOs by using the adjusted returns in 
order to take into consideration market returns and variances. All closing stock prices are 
adjusted for share capital increases and stock splits that occurred during the three-year period.  
       
 
     The adjusted return for issue i is defined as the raw return less the corresponding market 
return for the same time period used for raw return calculation: 
 
               Adjusted Returnit  (arit) = Raw Returnit (rit) –  Market Returnit (rmt)                         (1)   
 
     The average adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is the equally 
weighted arithmetic average of the adjusted returns. 
 
 
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     To check the stability of results, we also use cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR), 
as suggested by Fama (1998) and Ritter (1991). The cumulative adjusted aftermarket 
performance from event month q to event month s is the summation of the average adjusted 
returns. 
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tsq ARCAR ,                                                         (3) 
 
     Abnormal returns depend strongly on the benchmark used. Given that the correct 
benchmark is unknown, it is important to test several model specifications and look at the 
sensitivity of results. Brav and Gompers (1997), Stehle et al. (2000) and Drobetz et al. (2005) 
have shown empirically that when controlling for effects such as size or book-to-market, the 
long-term underperformance of IPOs decreases, or even disappears.  
     To calculate the abnormal return ai, the first benchmark we use is the standard Capital 
Asset Pricing Model. The second is a multi-index model using the market index as one factor 
and the difference between the Smaller Companies Index and the market index as the 
measure of smaller companies’ differential performances (Dimson and Marsh, 1996 and 
Espenlaub et al., 2000). The third benchmark is another multi-index model where the factors 
are those specified by Carhart (1997), who extends the Fama and French model for 
momentum phenomena. 
 
Model 1: CAPM  
  
itftmtiitftit eRRaRR  )(                                                  (4) 
 
where Rit is the monthly return for each security, Rmt is the return on the Greek market in 
event month t as measured by the return on the Athens Stock Exchange General Index 
(ASEGI), Rft is the treasury bill (T-bill) return in event month t, and i is the CAPM beta of 
company i.  
 
Model 2: Value-weighted multi-index model using the Smaller Companies Index (SCI)  
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          ptmtscpftmtppftpt eRRRRaRR  )()()(                              (5) 
 
where Rsc is the return on the Smaller Companies Index (SCI) in the event month t. The SCI 
is a value-weighted index of the bottom 80% of market capitalization of the companies 
quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange.  
 
Jegadeesh et al. (1993) and Carhart (1997) have shown momentum in stock returns to be a 
significant factor in explaining performance. This is a factor in the Fama-French model, 
expressed as UMD, defined as the equally weighted average return of the top 30 percent of 
firms with the highest returns minus the equally weighted average of bottom 30 percent firms 
with the lowest returns for the preceding month. 
 
Model 3: Carhart (1997) momentum extension model (FF4F) 
 
pttptptpftmtppftpt eUMDHMLSMBRRaRR   )()(               (6) 
 
where Rpt is the calendar-time portfolio return, Rft is the return of 1-month Treasury Bill, 
(Rmt-Rft) is the return on the value-weighted portfolio, SMBt is the difference in returns of 
value-weighted portfolios of small and big firms during month t, HMLt is the return 
differential of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in a month, 
and UMDt is the difference between returns of portfolios of high-and-low momentum stocks.  
     Underperformance implies that the intercepts in times-series regressions of equation (4-6) 
should be statistically significant and less than zero. To test the null hypothesis that the mean 
buy-and-hold abnormal return is equal (different) to zero for the sample of IPO firms, we 
employ a conventional t-statistic: 
nAR
AR
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                                                          (7) 
In addition to “event-time” analysis, we also perform calendar-time analysis to check the 
influence of specific periods of very intense IPO activity on the results.  
     The next step involves the estimation of multivariate regressions in order to check for 
determinants of cross-sectional variation of long-run performance. Previous studies have 
identified a number of possible determinants. We chose six factors for tests. Table 2 
summarizes the explanatory variables, briefly giving their definition and measurements.  
 
Table 2 
Summary of Explanatory Variables 
LBC is a market classification variable Greek IPOs are classified among three markets. We insert the value “1” 
if an IPO is listed in Main Market and “0” if listed in Parallel or New Market - PRIV takes the value “0” for. 
companies partially or fully owned by the state before going public (privatized firms),value “1” for fully private 
companies  - Size, the logarithm of the total market capitalisation of an IPO - UR, Underwriters reputation: “1” 
for reputable underwriters – five older banking institutions – and “0” for lesser-known investment firms, - HDV,  
is the Hot Period e that takes the value “1” for IPOs listed in the hot period  - OC, represents the proportion of 
retained ownership by the pre-IPO shareholders.   
Variable Name  Variable Type of  Expected  
in Abbreviation Definition Measure Sign 
LBC 
Listing Board Classification  
(main or parallel market) 
Discrete 
+ 
PRIV Corporate Condition of the company Discrete + 
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SIZE 
Size of the IPO firms, calculated as 
the number of shares, multiplied 
by the offer price 
Continuous 
 
+ 
UR Underwriters’ Reputation Discrete + 
HDV Hot Period Dummy Variable Discrete - 
OC Ownership Concentration Continuous + 
      
     The choice of variables for the cross-sectional analysis is based on findings of previous 
research. Two continuous variables serve as proxies for firm-specific conditions (size and 
ownership concentration).  The binary variable on underwriter reputation7 is a possible proxy 
for quality. These variables are more specifically discussed in Section 5. We must note here 
that the binary variables that represent market conditions show sufficient discriminating 
power on a univariate basis within our sample. Thus, for example, Main market buy-and-hold 
returns (120 IPOs) over one, two, and three years respectively average 27.66%, 5.15% and -
21.39%. Parallel market returns (124 IPOs) returns are correspondingly 52.70%, 28.79%, and 
-3.56%. Finally, New Market returns (6 IPOs) show 77.01%, -0.92%, and -89.17%.     
     The influence of public versus private ownership on the level of IPO returns is estimated 
by our variable PRIV. International evidence (Hingorani et al. (1997), Megginson and Netter 
(2001), Jones et al. (1999) and Keloharju et al. (2008)) suggests that firms under private 
ownership experience higher average initial and lower long-run returns compared to state-
owned firms. It is noted that in our sample, the number of private firms is much larger than 
the public sector companies. In particular, of 254 IPOs, only 14 are state-owned companies. 
The initial excess return is 37.52% for private IPOs and 20.66% for state-owned IPOs. The 
long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns range from 46.67% (six months) to -16.16% (three 
years) for the private IPOs and from 37.25% (six months) to -3.50% (three years) for the 
state-owned newly listed enterprises on the A.S.E. Thus, it appears that prima facie Greek 
results resemble the international evidence.  
     The window of opportunity for an IPO is related to market conditions. Several authors 
have examined this issue. (Lowry (2003), Gajeski and Gresse (2006), Derrien and Kecskés 
(2007) Bancel and Mittoo (2009)). Table 1 shows clear evidence of a “hot period” in the 
Greek market during the period 1998-2000 and an unprecedented amount of capital raised 
through IPOs. Furthermore, short-term IPO returns during this same period increased greatly, 
as we already mentioned in Section 2. 
 
4. Aftermarket performance 
 
4.1. Basic findings for the buy-and-hold and cumulative abnormal returns of IPOs. 
In Table 3, we show the average BHARs of IPOs undertaken during the period 1994-2002. 
Panel A shows the adjusted returns,8 which are calculated based on the listing price of new 
issues and the closing price of the ASEGI on the last day of the public offering period. The 
second panel reports the BHARs that are calculated, based on closing price at the end of the 
first day of trading and the closing price of ASEGI on the same date. The third panel reports 
adjusted returns based on the closing price at the end of the first month of trading and the 
corresponding closing price on the ASEGI. In Figure 1, we show a diagram of the evolution 
of BHARs over 36 months after listing.  
                                                 
7 The variable of underwriter reputation (UR) refers to the distinction between the five older, larger and more experienced 
Greek banking institutions and other underwriter investment firms. It is used as a proxy of high quality of scrutiny at the 
time of issue. It takes the value of 1 for the banks and 0 otherwise.  
8 The adjusted returns have been calculated as the raw returns minus returns of the General Index of the A.S.E. for the same 
time period used for raw returns calculation. 
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 The initial excess return received by investors was substantial and reached the level of 
almost 40 percent (38.94 percent). Moreover, the one-year mean-adjusted return calculated 
on the basis of listing price, the first-day closing price, and the first-month closing price 
reached 40.82%, 15.71% and 4.11%, respectively. The two-year returns were 13.49, 8.09 and 
-12.42. Finally, the corresponding three-year returns were -15.35%, -31.43% and -37.56%. 
These results reveal that new issues in the Greek stock market offer investors substantial  
Table 3 
 
Buy-And-Hold Adjusted Returns9 for IPOs from the Athens Stock Exchange  
Time Period 1994-2002  
 
Buy-And-Hold Adjusted Returns are defined as the raw returns less the corresponding market returns: returns of 
the General Index of the A.S.E. (value-weighted index) for the same time period used for raw returns 
calculation. IPO-adjusted returns taken in a three-year period (from beginning of first day of trading until 36 
months after going public) are based on IPO prices of offer price period, end of first trading day and end of first 
trading month. The differences in the number of firms in each panel are due to not having the data for the period 
of analysis to estimate three- and five-year returns. Total returns include both capital gains and dividends.   
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%)  
Number of 
observations 
Median 
(%) 
Minimum 
Return 
(%) 
Maximum 
Return 
(%) 
Panel A: Excess or Adjusted Buy-And-Hold Returns based on the listing price  
1st day 38.94*** 61.21 253 14.14 -41.84 397.41 
6 months 45.18*** 70.34 252 26.75 -74.94 252.47 
12 months 40.82*** 82.73 247 18.03 -108.60 298.11 
18 months 28.51*** 83.29 241 8.79 -245.60 298.33 
24 months 13.49*** 13.49 240 3.66 -266.96 247.14 
30 months        -2.00* 88.82 237 -4.29 -246.93 286.93 
36 months -15.35** 101.34 232 -11.49 -395.22 275.82 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%)  
Number of 
observations 
Median 
(%) 
Minimum 
Return 
(%) 
Maximum 
Return 
(%) 
Panel B: Excess or Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns based on the first day closing price 
6 months 12.16*** 47.78 254 -0.58 -73.80 147.98 
12 months 15.71*** 68.82 247 0.289 -107.47 249.53 
18 months 13.54** 82.01 241 -9.36 -241.24 282.61 
24 months 8.09** 63.30 240 -3.20 -262.22 208.38 
30 months -16.53*** 84.98 237 -17.94 -286.76 294.43 
36 months -31.43** 97.45 231 -20.73 -437.01 249.82 
Return of Mean Return  
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%)  
Number of 
observations 
Median 
(%) 
Minimum 
Return 
(%) 
Maximum 
Return 
(%) 
Panel C: Excess or Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns based on the first month closing price 
6 months 5.71** 42.47 254 -4.97 -59.17 186.07 
12 months 4.11** 55.39 246 -6.67 -96.62 262.58 
18 months 0.63** 71.25 242 -14.75 -203.8 364.81 
                                                 
9 The IPO price changes that give the adjusted returns include dividends. 
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24 months -12.42** 66.63 239 -18.08 -223.27 285.75 
30 months -31.24** 73.73 237 -24.15 -230.69 267.70 
36 months -37.56*** 83.76 232 -22.69 -256.72 251.72 
*Significance level at 10%, ** Significance level at 5%, ***Significance level at 1%, 
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The figure arises the excessive returns (Adjusted IPO returns=Raw IPO returns – market returns) of Greek IPOs on a  
three-year period based on their market prices  of first trading day and month. The y-axis in the figure is the Average  
Abnormal Returns while the x-axis is the holding period 
 
Fig. 1 Adjusted Returns of IPOs on the A.S.E.  (First day closing day and month basis) 
 
long-run adjusted returns for about two years after listing. This positive IPO performance for 
about two years distinguishes the Greek market from other cases where the positive returns 
wane at the end of the first three months or, at most, within one year after listing10.   
     The figure shows the excess returns (Adjusted IPO returns=Raw IPO returns – market 
returns) of Greek IPOs during a three-year period based on their market prices at the end of 
first trading day and month. The y-axis in the figure represents the Average Abnormal 
Returns while the x-axis represents the holding period. 
     Table 4 reports monthly average and cumulative abnormal returns, commencing on the 
first day of listing. The equally weighted CAR in month 36 is -16.18%; thus, an equal 
investment in each of these IPOs would have resulted in a loss of approximately 1/6 the value 
of the initial portfolio over a three-year period. Notably, the cumulative average-adjusted 
returns remain positive for 22 months after listing. This is comparable to the findings of 
Table 3 based on BHARs. Thus, our results are stable and do not depend on choice-of-return 
calculation. 
     The sample size in Table 4 decreases from 254 IPOs to only 231 in the three-year period; 
fourteen firms have available price observations for less than 36 months, five experienced a 
successful takeover and four liquidated with no cash returns to shareholders. 
 
                                                 
10 In other words, we find evidence that investors who participated in the Greek IPO market during the period 1994-2002, 
and who bought stocks at the listing price/at the closing first-day price/at the closing day of the first-month and held them for 
a three-year period, obtained long-term negative returns even on the basis of listing price, because the listing prices of IPOs 
were slightly higher than their equilibrium prices formed at the 750th day of trading. We should note that the range of the 
above IPO returns is wide, fluctuating from -395.22% to 275.82% (adjusted returns based on listing price) from -437.01% to 
249.82% (adjusted returns based on first-day closing price) and from -256.72% to 251.72% (adjusted returns based on first-
month closing price). We must point out that results of Table 3 were extracted from a sample that exempted a few outliers. 
Specifically, in several cases returns over three years raised form 540 to 4480 percent. We thought their exclusion prudent so 
that we would be sure that persistent overpricing is not driven by a few very large returns.  
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4.2. The findings using alternative benchmark models and matching samples 
 
Ritter (1991) offers an early argument that CARs and BHARs can be used to answer different 
questions regarding long-term performance of IPOs. Barber and Lyon (1997) favor the use of 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns over cumulative abnormal returns on conceptual grounds.  
 
Table 4 
Abnormal returns for initial Public Offerings in 1994-2002 
Post-listing average-adjusted returns (ARt) with associated t statistics and cumulative average returns (CARt) for 
the 36 months (where month one represents the market index-adjusted return from the last sale price on the day 
of listing to the end of that calendar month) after going public, excluding the initial return. Our final sample 
constitutes 254 Greek initial public offers of ordinary equity made between January 1994 and December 2002, 
calculated on the basis of an equal euro investment in each issue. 
Month  No of firms trading ARt (%) t-stat CARt  (%) 
1 254 2.513 3.002 2.513 
2 254 0.233 0.279 2.746 
3 254 0.964 1.036 3.710 
4 254 0.486 0.490 4.197 
5 254 -0.184 -0.279 4.012 
6 254 -0.769 -0.876 3.243 
7 254 0.504 0.522 3.747 
8 253 -0.298 -0.326 3.449 
9 253 0.051 0.072 3.500 
10 250 0.281 -0.331 3.781 
11 248 1.002 1.189 4.783 
12 247 0.611 0.065 5.395 
13 245 0.213 0.227 5.609 
14 244 -1.002 -1.029 4.606 
15 244 -0.122 0.134 4.483 
16 243 -0.587 -0.616 3.895 
17 243 -0.920 -0.970 2.975 
18 241 -0.069 -0.075 2.905 
19 241 0.489 0.521 3.395 
20 241 -0.649 -0.737 2.745 
21 241 -1.503 -1.424 1.241 
22 241 -0.723 -0.847 0.517 
23 240 -1.046 -1.104 -0.528 
24 240 -1.402 -1.491 -1.931 
25 240 -0.798 -0.829 -2.725 
26 239 -2.117 -2.457 -4.847 
27 238 -1.550 -1.611 -6.397 
28 237 -0.933 -1.028 -7.331 
29 237 -1.543 -1.754 -8.874 
30 237 -0.798 -0.940 -9.673 
31 236 -1.507 -1.604 -11.181 
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32 236 -1.385 -1.601 -12.566 
33 234 -1.412 -1.561 -13.978 
34 233 0.104 0.111 -13.874 
35 233 -0.963 -1.046 -14.838 
36 231 -1.339 -1.499 -16.177 
     In Table 5, we evaluate the empirical specification and power of test statistics based on 
both CAR and BHAR at one-, two-, and three-year horizons. We measure abnormal returns 
following the IPO using the three models specified in Section 3.2. We have also selected 
matching non-IPO firms11 of similar size and sector. These tests examine the sensitivity of 
results to alternative benchmark specifications. They will also establish a direct comparison 
within each benchmark model between IPO- and non-IPO-matching samples. In Table 5, we 
estimate the difference of abnormal returns between IPO- and non-IPO-matching firms.  
     The results of Table 5 confirm our basic findings. Estimates of excess returns in the table 
are made on the basis of closing prices one month after trading is initiated and thus embody 
the positive impact in the short term after-market. We derive three important conclusions 
from these findings. The first tells us that the results are not particularly sensitive to 
benchmark specification. The second conclusion is that what we found using the simple 
adjustment model continues to hold true as we move to more sophisticated benchmarks: 
Greek IPOs maintain a positive abnormal return on average for 18 months after listing. After 
the 18-month interval, adjusted returns turn increasingly negative up to the 36th month.  
 
Table 5 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
The table presents 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months, Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
calculated from the end of the first month of trading. Abnormal returns are calculated using CAPM, SC and the Fama and French (FF) four-
factor model. The intercept i is interpreted as the mean monthly abnormal return of the portfolio. Statistical significance is calculated by 
using the time-series standard deviation of the mean monthly abnormal returns. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
 12 
months 
18 
month 
24 
months 
30 
months 
36 
months 
12 
months 
18 
months 
24 
months 
30 
months 
36 
months 
CAPM 1.335c 0.972 c -0.374c -1.025 b -1.617b 0.672b 0.082a -0.785b -1.337b -1.851c 
 254 253 253 253 253 253 253 251 251 250 
IPOs - 
Matching 
0.944c 0.217 c -0.659c -1.238 c -1.752c 0.513a -0.138 -0.943c -1.648b -2.053c 
 254 253 253 251 251 253 253 253 251 251 
           
SC 1.095c 0.394 b -0.418b -1.183 b -1.653c 0.742c -0.217c -0.544c -1.043c -1.354c 
 254 254 254 252 252 252 253 252 250 250 
IPOs - 
Matching 
0.817b 0.268 a -0.583b -1.311b -1.972c 0.124 0.043 -0.078 -0.113 -0.136 
 254 253 252 251 251 254 253 253 252 252 
                                                 
11 In order to select matching firms for the 254 IPOs during the period 1994-2002, the following procedure was employed. 
Among firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, their market values were computed annually on December 31st. These 
firms were ranked by market value. If a matching firm in the same industry was not available, then a firm in another industry 
was chosen, with preference given to firms in relative industries (i.e. chemicals, mining, oil and gas). For companies going 
public in 1995, the market value of a listed firm at the end of 1994 was used. For firms going public in 2000, the market 
value of a listed firm at the end of 1999 was used. This procedure resulted in 245 matching firms, as nine of them were used 
in more than one case. Special care was taken to avoid “survivorship bias.” This was accomplished by choosing a matching 
firm regardless of whether it was later delisted. Few matching firms were delisted at a time earlier than the 3-year 
anniversary date. In those few cases, the matching firm was replaced using the same procedure. The matching company’s 
returns were aligned over exactly the same horizon as the IPO. 
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FF4F 1.103c 0.462c -0.543c -1.307b -1.821c 0.714c 0.146b -0.752c -1.418c -1.924c 
 253 253 252 251 250 249 249 249 249 249 
IPOs - 
Matching 
0.898c 0.271c -0.508c -1.525c -2.023c 0.159 0.032 -0.292 -0.762a -1.126 
 254 253 252 252 252 254 254 254 254 254 
Thirdly, we conclude that a comparison of IPO and non-IPO firms generally confirms that 
either positive or negative excess returns associated with IPO firms represent a significant 
departure from the return behavior of matching firms. Thus, IPO performance is clearly 
distinct from non-IPO performance. This conclusion, however, is much more strongly 
founded on estimations of BHARs than CARs. In the case of CARs (the right side of Table 
5), differences between IPO and non-IPO firms are statistically significant only in the case of 
CAPM estimation, but not in the other cases. This could result from the selection of matching 
firms on the basis of both sector and size. Controlling for size effect in the benchmark model 
possibly weakens the differential between the two samples. However, as this is not true in the 
case of BHARs, our findings appear to retain their validity.  
 
 
4.3 A Calendar-Time Approach 
 
One possible criticism of this type of finding appears in the work of Espenlaub et al. (2000).  
They suggest that a comparatively short period of severe underperformance of IPOs might 
affect the overall picture. In our case, for example, the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns in Table 5 will be emphasized in the presence of cross-correlation, as the t-tests 
assume independent observations. However, observations may actually not be independent, 
as IPOs are clustered within short calendar intervals. In our case, the time distribution of 
IPOs is wide, but the amount of capital sought and raised was indeed clustered in a sub-
period of our observations, as indicated in Table 1. To control for this possibility of bias, we 
re-estimate return regressions based on a calendar-time approach12. We can test the simplest 
aspect of the “window of opportunity” hypothesis with this approach.   
     The window of opportunity for an IPO may be determined by market conditions. Lowry 
(2003)13 suggests that in a bullish market, the number of IPOs tends to increase because the 
placement of stocks is easier, the risk of failure of an IPO is lower and securities are priced 
higher. These factors soften the cost of initial underpricing. Schultz (2003) calls this 
hypothesis “pseudo market-timing” and demonstrates that long-term underperformance is 
linked to IPO clustering. International evidence shows weaker long-term returns for firms 
that go bankrupt. In his work he supposes that periods of “hot markets” attract “good” firms 
as well as “bad” firms, the latter being offered to the market by less scrupulous 
intermediaries. In Europe, Derrien and Kecskés (2007) attempt to fill this gap by providing 
empirical evidence of market timing for AIM IPOs in the UK, and only Gajeski and Gresse 
(2006) have formally tested the market timing hypothesis.  
     In each period, we cumulate returns of IPOs that occurred in the previous 12, 24, or 36 
months of observation. We introduce a binary variable (ZETA) that we associate with 
observations of returns for IPOs introduced during the “hot IPO period” 1998-2000. During 
                                                 
12 Calendar portfolios are value-weighted. Fama and French (1993, 1996) document that three-factor models have systematic  
problems in explaining the average returns on categories of small stocks. Loughran and Ritter (2000) confirm that multi-
factor regressions fail in detecting abnormal returns that are present, especially when the target population composes small 
stocks like typical IPOs. Value-weighting is used to avoid giving more weight to small stocks. 
13  Lowry (2003) indicates that firms’ demands for capital and investor sentiment are important determinants of IPO volume,  
in both statistical and economic terms. Adverse selection costs are also statistically significant, but their economic effect  
appears small. 
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that period, both the market and the supply of IPOs crested in a large wave, as seen in Table 
1. In these tests, we again use the three benchmark models specified above. The intercept of 
the regressions captures the excess returns. The coefficient of the binary variable ZETA will 
show the modification of the intercept for returns of IPOs introduced during the “hot period.”  
Our hypothesis is that the coefficient of ZETA in the following equations will be positive and 
significant.  
 
Model 4: Extension of CAPM for ‘Hot’ Market Conditions 
  
ititftmtiitftit eHOTzRRaRR  )(                                              (8) 
 
 
Model 5: Smaller Companies Index (SCI) extended for ‘Hot’ Market Conditions   
 
              ptpmtscpftmtppftpt
eHOTzRRRRaRR  )()()(                             (9) 
 
 
Model 6: Carhart (1997) momentum extended for ‘Hot’ Market Conditions   
 
ptptptptpftmtppftpt eHOTzUMDHMLSMBRRaRR   )()(            (10) 
 
     Our hypothesis here is based on the theoretical expectation that the “Greek exception” of 
positive returns is not a general phenomenon, but rather was rooted in the wave of 1998-
2000, which combined two features: the years 1998-99 experienced a very pronounced 
market boom. In the year 2000, the market boom abated; however, a big institutional event 
was looming:  perceptions of Greece’s joining the Eurozone in 2001 solidified. These 
perceptions did not only create expectations of a macro-economic nature. They included the 
implication that, as a major part of exchange risk would be eliminated from Greek shares and 
as market regulation would converge to European standards, the Greek market would 
graduate from the status of “emerging” to the status of “developed market.” These 
expectations were in fact realized. The combination of market conditions and broad 
institutional change could indeed be the foundation of the “Greek exception.” Owners of 
firms had reason to believe that the shares they would float would gain a permanent value 
component from the transition to a Eurozone “developed market” status. This belief actually 
contributed to oversupply of primary listings.  
     In Table 6, we show results for each of our benchmark models14. The results are quite 
revealing, as they show significant differences both among periods and among benchmarks. 
If we look across the panels at the CAPM estimations, we see a uniform result. The intercepts 
are negative and significant everywhere, but the coefficients of the “hot period dummy” 
throughout are positive, significant and much larger than the intercepts. The implication of 
this finding is that IPOs were more strongly underpriced during the “hot period,” relative to 
the other periods in our sample observations.  
     The two more sophisticated models reveal a more complex pattern of finding.  Results 
change as we move from short- to longer-term excess returns. The 12-month return 
estimation shows neither intercepts nor dummy coefficients that are significantly different 
from zero. Thus, they seem to imply that IPO yearly returns neither over- nor underperform. 
                                                 
14 Mimicking portfolios indicate the proportion of mean return attributable to four elementary strategies: high versus low 
beta stocks, large versus small market capitalization stocks, value versus growth stocks, and one-year return momentum 
versus contrarian stocks (Carhart (1999)). 
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The 18-, 24- and 30-month estimations yield a mixed picture. Intercepts are significantly 
negative in both the SCI and FF4F models, implying that Greek IPO returns have behaved in 
line with the international evidence. However, the “hot period dummy” coefficient is strongly 
positive. This implies that IPOs associated with the “hot period” overperformed, whereas  
 
 
Table 6 
Calendar-time regression for alternative benchmark models 
Time-series models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model, a multi-index model using the excess return on the 
SCI, and the Carhart (1997) extension of Fama and French (1993) model. Figures in brackets are the t statistics. 
The regressions in each case are estimated using monthly observations, with the dependent variable being either 
the return on a 12-, 18-, 24-, 30- or the 36-month portfolio of IPOs minus the risk-free rate and the independent 
variables being the benchmark factors. Beta is the sensitivity of the excess returns on the company to the excess 
return in the market (ASEGI); Gamma is the sensitivity of the excess returns on the company to the “small firms 
premium”, which is taken as (Rsc-Rmt) for SCI model, and as SML for FF4F; Delta is the sensitivity to the HML 
factor in the FF4F models; Epsilon is the sensitivity to the momentum factor in the FF4F model and Zeta is the 
dummy variable for the “hot IPO period” 1998-2000. In the case of the FF4F model, the dependent variable 
(Rpt-Rft) is the excess return on an equally weighted (τ=12, 18, 24, 30 or 36 months) portfolio of IPOs that were 
issued up to month t; Alpha is the intercept term.15  
 
Panel A: 12-month portfolio 
 CAPM SC FF4F 
Alpha  -0.00851 -0.00302 -0.00247 
t-stat (-2.509) (-0.900) (-0.755) 
Beta 0.569 0.394 0.395 
t-stat (11.058) (6.233) (6.098) 
Gamma  0.366 0.368 
T-stat  (4.787) (3.012) 
Delta   -0.044 
t-stat   (-0.344) 
Epsilon   -0.010 
t-stat   (-0.161) 
Zeta 0.136 -0.048 -0.001 
t-stat (2.647) (-0.140) (-0.023) 
Adj R2 0.338 0.394 0.394 
Panel B: 18-month portfolio  
 CAPM SC FF4F 
Alpha  -0.0203 -0.0152 -0.0133 
t-stat (-5.876) (-4.428) (-4.081) 
Beta 0.636 0.534 0.483 
t-stat (12.734) (8.791) (7.253) 
Gamma  0.192 0.061 
T-stat  (2.891) (0.350) 
Delta   0.127 
t-stat   (0.673) 
                                                 
15 We performed tests for alternative benchmarks such as the size control portfolio (SD) and Fama and French three-factor 
models (FF3F) as dependent variables.  The results have been similar to those reported for SC and FF4F  
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Epsilon   0.095 
t-stat   (1.477) 
Zeta 0.283 0.173 0.130 
t-stat (5.662) (2.789) (1.921) 
Adj R2 0.401 0.425 0.433 
Panel C: 24-month portfolio  
 CAPM SC FF4F 
Alpha  -0.0263 -0.0211 -0.0173 
t-stat (-7.876) (-6.453) (-4.972) 
Beta 0.669 0.564 0.453 
t-stat (13.488) (9.777) (6.230) 
Gamma  0.202 0.057 
T-stat  (3.352) (0.309) 
Delta   0.132 
t-stat   (0.678) 
Epsilon   0.163 
t-stat   (2.286) 
Zeta 0.327 0.218 0.149 
t-stat (6.606) (3.736) (2.300) 
Adj R2 0.433 0.457 0.472 
Panel D: 30-month portfolio  
 CAPM SC FF4F 
Alpha  -0.0302 -0.0236 -0.0181 
t-stat (-8.722) (-7.075) (-5.252) 
Beta 0.760 0.629 0.486 
t-stat (14.413) (10.787) (6.319) 
Gamma  0.251 0.276 
T-stat  (4.549) (1.394) 
Delta   -0.108 
t-stat   (-0.517) 
Epsilon   0.229 
t-stat   (3.210) 
Zeta 0.351 0.204 0.153 
t-stat (6.667) (3.400) (2.243) 
Adj R2 0.454 0.496 0.517 
Panel E: 36-month portfolio  
 CAPM SC FF4F 
Alpha  -0.0154 -0.00524 -0.0003 
t-stat (-4.471) (-1.412) (0.020) 
Beta 0.631 0.344 0.133 
t-stat (9.973) (4.843) (1.619) 
Gamma  0.438 0.554 
T-stat  (6.951) (2.677) 
Delta   -0.284 
t-stat   (-1.306) 
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Epsilon   0.395 
t-stat   (5.320) 
Zeta 0.172 -0.137 -0.132 
t-stat (2.727) (-1.870) (-1.861) 
Adj R2 0.307 0.420 0.480 
 
those that occurred in other periods underperformed. Finally, the 36-month estimation yields 
both intercepts and dummy variable coefficients that are negative and significant. Hence, 
when we measure excess returns over a long enough interval (36 months in this case), all 
IPOs appear to underperform. These findings are quite interesting. They offer an elaboration 
of findings in previous sections: in the short and medium term, IPO returns appear positive. 
These positive returns are bunched in the “hot IPO period.” In the long run, IPO performance 
aligns with international experience and transforms to clear underperformance.   
     The two more sophisticated models reveal a more complex pattern of finding.  Results 
change as we move from short- to longer-term excess returns. The 12-month return 
estimation shows neither intercepts nor dummy coefficients that are significantly different 
from zero. Thus, they seem to imply that IPO yearly returns neither over- nor underperform. 
The 18-, 24- and 30-month estimations yield a mixed picture. Intercepts are significantly 
negative in both the SCI and FF4F models, implying that Greek IPO returns have behaved in 
line with the international evidence. However, the “hot period dummy” coefficient is strongly 
positive. This implies that IPOs associated with the “hot period” overperformed, whereas 
those that occurred in other periods underperformed. Finally, the 36-month estimation yields 
both intercepts and dummy variable coefficients that are negative and significant. Hence, 
when we measure excess returns over a long enough interval (36 months in this case), all 
IPOs appear to underperform. These findings are quite interesting. They offer an elaboration 
of findings in previous sections: in the short and medium term, IPO returns appear positive. 
These positive returns are bunched in the “hot IPO period.” In the long run, IPO performance 
aligns with international experience and transforms to clear underperformance.   
 
5. Cross-sectional Regression Results   
We finally hypothesize that long-run IPO performance is a function of the condition and 
quality of firms and markets when firms decide to go public. We use a number of 
characteristics (listing board classification, privatization of public sector firms, size, 
ownership concentration, underwriters’ reputations, and hot IPO period). These have been 
used elsewhere as proxies for quality and reputation of the firms and for market quality and 
condition. We estimate a series of multiple-regression models, using buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) and residuals from the FF4F model as dependent variables for three years 
after going public. The regression model is: 
 
(BHAR) or (FF4F Residuals) = a + β1 (LBC) + β2(PRIV) + β3Log(SIZE) + β4 (UR) +β5 
(HDV) + β6 (OC) + εi   (11) 
 
     Our first variable, LBC, is expected to proxy for higher firm reputation for those IPOs that 
can attain the listing on the main market. Consistent with Ljungqvist et al. (2003), who 
reported that IPOs traded in the primary market yield higher returns in the long run, we 
expect this to exert a positive influence on returns.  
     IPO size (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of market capitalization of the offering. In 
previous studies, Keloharju (1993) and Goergen et al. (2007) have shown better long-term 
performance for large IPOs, and we expect that size will be associated with better long-term 
performance.  
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     The privatization variable (PRIV) is binary and distinguishes between public sector firms 
and private firms being listed.16 Our expectation is that public sector firms are more highly 
scrutinized at the time of listing and therefore will present higher long-term performance 
(Perotti and Guney (1993), Perotti (1995), Megginson et al. (2000)). International evidence 
(Hingorani et al. (1997), Megginson and Netter (2001), Jones et al. (1999) and Keloharju et 
al. (2008)) suggests that firms under private ownership experience higher average initial and 
lower long-run returns compared to state-owned firms. It is noted that in our sample, the 
number of private firms is much larger than the public sector companies. In particular, of 254 
IPOs, only 14 are IPOs performed by state-owned companies. The initial excess return is 
37.52% for private IPOs and 20.66% for state-owned IPOs. The long-run buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns range from 46.67% (six months) to -16.16% (three years) for the private 
IPOs and from 37.25% (six months) to -3.50% (three years) for the state-owned newly listed 
enterprises. Thus, it appears that prima facie Greek results resemble the international 
evidence.  
     The percentage of ownership retained by original shareholders at the time of issue (OC) is 
another firm-specific variable that we use. Our hypothesis is that higher retention will proxy 
for lower uncertainty about the quality of the firm and will therefore be associated with better 
long-run performance. Indeed, empirical findings from IPOs in other markets have supported 
this hypothesis (Goergen et al. (2007) for example).  
     Jenkinson and Jones (2009) report strong competition between banks for lead underwriter, 
but having committed to a particular bank, the power of the issuer is greatly reduced. The 
variable of underwriter reputation (UR), which distinguishes the five banking institutions as 
lead underwriters, is used as a proxy of high quality of scrutiny at the time of issue. Thus, in 
line with other studies, (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002), Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), 
Doukas and Gonenc (2005)17, Johnson and Westberg (2009)), we hypothesize that this 
variable will positively affect long-run returns.  
     Finally, we use a dummy variable for “hot” periods. The window of opportunity for an 
IPO is related to market conditions. Several authors have examined this issue. (Lowry (2003), 
Gajeski and Gresse (2006), Derrien and Kecskés (2007), Bancel and Mittoo (2009)). Table 1 
shows clear evidence of a “hot period” in the Greek market during the period 1998-2000 and 
an unprecedented amount of capital raised through IPOs. The short-term IPO returns during 
this same period increased greatly, as we already mentioned in Section 2. The hot periods are 
those years when the Greek market showed high positive performance and when IPOs 
crowded the waiting line for listing. We expect that IPO overpricing in “hot” periods will be 
associated  with negative long-term returns in line with the findings in the calendar-time 
estimations in the previous section and with international evidence {(See Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) as well as Helwege and Liang (2004)}.18 
     In the estimation of the cross-sectional regression, we use two sets of returns for each 
case. BHARs and FF4F CARs are computed on two alternative bases: on closing prices after 
the first day of trading or after the first month of trading. In Table 7, regressions (1, 2) show 
the results using BHARs as dependent variables and regressions (3, 4) show the CARs 
extracted from the FF4F model. Because the dependent variable on the BHAR long-term 
                                                 
16 Roosenbloom and Schramade (2005) document that the large (non-pecuniary) private benefits of control in  
France may motivate owner-managers to retain control after the IPO. 
17 Doukas and Gonenc (2005) investigate the potential effects of the reputation of investment banking and venture capital on 
the long-term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) simultaneously. They indicate that the reputation of investment 
bankers matters only in the absence of venture capital. 
18 Jenkinson and Ljunqvist (2001) and Helwege and Liang (2004) report that ‘hot issue’ periods for IPOs offered 
extraordinary returns to investors, but the ones seen on IPOs in 1999 and the first half of 2000 (periods that our study covers) 
are quite unprecedented. Exceptional price movements, upwards and downwards, often result in the spotlight being turned 
on market intermediaries. 
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returns is skewed, the residuals are also highly non-normal; bootstrapped p-values are 
reported.19 
Table 7 
Results of multiple regressions using three-year BHARs and FF4F-CARs   
Multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional variation in long-run market index-adjusted (excess) returns – 
BHAR (over columns 1 and 2) and CARs for the Fama and French (FF) four-factor model Rpt-Rft=αi+βi(Rmt-
Rft)+γiSMBt+δiHMLt+εiUMDt+εpt (over columns 3 and 4) subsequent to listing for 254 Greek initial public 
offers of ordinary equity made between January 1994 and December 2002, calculated on the basis of an 
investment in each issue purchased at the closing price of the first day or first month, for a holding period of 
three years for various explanatory variables, with related t-statistics in parentheses. ER3Y1D - Adjusted returns 
from first-day price to three years after going public, ER3Y1M - Adjusted returns from first-month price to 
three years after going public, Size - The logarithm of the total market capitalisation of an IPO, OC - proportion 
of retained ownership by the initial shareholders,  PRIV - Companies partially or fully owned by the Greek state 
before going public, get the value “1” and fully private companies get the value “0”,  UR – Underwriters’ 
reputation: “1” for reputable underwriters – five older and more experienced in underwriting tasks banking 
institutions – and “0” for non reputable, HDV - IPOs listed in the Hot Period (1998-2000) get the value “1” and 
IPOs listed at other times get the value “0” , LBC - Greek IPOs are classified among three markets. We insert 
the value “1” if an IPO is listed in Main Market, and “0” if listed in the Parallel or New Markets *** 
Significance at the one per cent level. **Significance at the five per cent level *Significance at the ten per cent 
level; t-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West HAC Standard Errors and Covariance 
process. 
 
Specifications 
(1) 
ER3Y1D 
(2) 
ER3Y1M 
(3) 
ER3Y1D 
(4) 
ER3Y1M 
 BHAR FF4F-CAR 
Constant -87.547 -121.700 -4.439 -1.147 
SIZE -0.063 -0.035 0.091 0.041 
 (-0.805) (-0.449) (1.206) (0.490) 
OC  0.102 0.231 0.109 -0.039 
 (1.452) (3.319)*** (1.631) (-0.533) 
PRIV  0.012 -0.017 0.095 0.026 
 (0.013) (-0.263) (1.473) (0.372) 
UR -0.059 -0.067 0.023 -0.132 
 (-0.836) (-0.948) (0.336) (-1.741)* 
HDV  -0.136 -0.144 -0.323 0.014 
 (-1.715)* (-1.843)* (-4.260)*** (0.161) 
LBC 0.148 0.065 0.139 0.154 
 (1.943)* (0.855) (1.921)* (0.056) 
     
                                                 
19 Barber and Lyon (1997) document that positive skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics. To conduct significance 
tests for initial returns, we apply the skewness-adjusted t-statistic. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) argue that only the 
bootstrapped application of this skewness-adjusted test statistic yields well-specified test statistics. We follow their approach 
and report the adjusted t-statistics on the basis of the distribution of bootstrapped resamples. The hypothesis is that the 
number of observed positive initial returns equals the number of negative returns. Bootstrapping procedure as described by 
Noreen (1989) creates a coefficient vector under the null hypothesis of no relation by randomly reordering the 254 
dependent variable observations and running an OLS regression. This is repeated many times creating a distribution of least 
square coefficient vectors. The bootstrapped p-values are calculated by finding the location of the original coefficient vector 
in the ranked empirical distribution, variable by variable. The bootstrapped p-values that are reported are similar to the 
ordinary least squares values 
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Adj. R2 0.062 0.079 0.108 0.041 
No. of IPOs 254 254 254 254 
F-statistic 2.561 3.353 4.873 1.522 
 
      
     When using BHARs as the dependent variables, the listing board classification exerts a 
positive influence over a three-year long-term period and so does owners’ concentration. 
These two variables appear with a positive and significant coefficient in two different 
regressions. The “hot period variable” throughout the three-year term shows a negative 
influence. When we use FF4F CARs as a dependent variable (1, 2) listing board classification 
comes out positive again, and the “hot period variable” comes out as insignificant in one 
regression. Underwriter reputation obtains a negative coefficient in one of the FF4F 
regressions. 
     Our general conclusion is that these regressions although not very strong, offer some 
evidence of the determinants of long-term returns. Listing board classification and owner 
concentration appear to exert positive influence. These two variables reflect higher firm 
quality, and apparently they boost long-term performance.  
     Underwriter reputation appears as a negative determinant in one regression out of four. 
This is the regression in which FF4F CARs are calculated on the basis of the closing price 
after the first month of trading. CARs calculated on the basis of closing price after the first 
day of trading do not show this effect.  Hence the finding suggests the possibility that 
reputable underwriters fostered high aftermarket prices in the short run (i.e. in the first month 
of trading), producing more pronounced subsequent negative returns.  
     Finally, the negative influence of the “hot period dummy” is as expected, and the findings 
are perfectly consistent with what we found in Table 6. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have established four basic findings. First, short-term overperformance of 
Greek IPOs is undisputed and in line with international evidence. Second, overperformance 
continues for a much longer period than in other markets, extending to between 18 and 24 
months after listing. This has given rise to evidence that the Greek case is an exception, as 
rates of return are different than those found for other markets (Gajeski and Gresse (2006)). 
In fact, our third finding shows that eventually this “Greek exception” is restored, as we find 
that in three-year returns, Greek IPOs underperform the market, as most international studies 
confirm.  
     We have tested the stability of our results using alternative estimates of excess returns, 
alternative benchmark models (CAPM, Small Cap, Fama-French-Carhart models), alternative 
constructions of time series (event-time versus calendar-time) and comparisons with a non-
IPO sample of matching firms. Such extensive testing has not been performed before on 
Greek data. We are satisfied that our results have passed the test of stability, and that our 
main findings do not depend on the alternative benchmarks and variable specifications.  
     Cross-sectional analysis points to up to three factors that affect long-term performance. 
Listing on the main market and the retention of a higher percentage of original owner 
concentration appear as positive influences, proxying for higher firm quality. Our measure of 
underwriter reputation indicates a negative influence on performance in one of our models. 
Although the result is sensitive to the benchmark model used, it casts doubt on the role of 
“reputable underwriters” (i.e. large banks) in Greece as certifiers of firm quality. Rather, they 
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may have engendered a much hotter short-term aftermarket, setting the scene for later 
underperformance.  
     Perhaps the most meaningful is our fourth finding. This relates to pricing during the “hot 
IPO period.” This period is associated with positive short (1-year) and medium (2-year) 
performance, but with negative long-term (3-year) performance. Since an unprecedented 
amount of capital was sought and raised by IPOs in Greece during the ‘hot period’, it is seen 
that the features of these IPOs played a critical role in our results, as shown by our calendar-
time regressions. In our opinion, during hot periods, there are not only tendencies of short-
term overpricing due to investor sentiment, but also strong countering tendencies of 
underpricing due to strong issuer competition, as an “IPO wave” developed. We believe that 
this occurred in Greece because a strong market boom appeared along with major 
institutional change: the entry of Greece into the Eurozone, regulatory modernization and the 
transition of the Greek market to “developed market” status. These conditions heightened the 
rush to IPOs during the period 1998-2000 and created a long waiting line for listing. In that 
context, strong issuer competition was quite evident and has contributed to the findings of our 
study, and to the appearance of a “Greek exception.”   
     On a more general level, this study of the “Greek exception” clearly shows that even 
where there are longer-lasting positive excess returns after IPOs, eventually negative returns 
emerge. This conclusion strengthens the recognition that IPO pricing is not efficient in the 
long term, despite appearances of impressive short- or even medium-term gains, as in the 
case of Greece. 
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